The Iranian Army in the late August 1941

Seyyed Mostafa Taqavi

 

Throughout the Iranian history, especially after the establishment of the Safavids and the foreign countries threatening of Iran's integrity, the reinforcement of the country's defence became one of the main priorities of Iran. Iran's defeat of Russian's forces under FathAli Shah Qajar impressed the necessity more than ever. This strengthening of the army was against the imperialistic goals of the great powers. So no Qajar king succeeded to form such an army. Due to this reason, even on the eve of the Constitutional revolution, and against all the emphasis put on it by the Najaf clergy, this wish did not come true.

 

Following the Bolshevic revolution of Russia, and the need of the British to recall their forces after the world war one, it was decided to form forces to fill the vaccum, and actually Reza Shah was missioned by the British to perform the task.

 

This army played a main role in suppression of national movements, and consolidation of the coup government.

 

Prior to the collapse of the army and his departure from Iran, in sep. 1941. Reza Shah announced that: "My forces are the best in the world." But the question is that why the so-called best army of the world could not resist the invasion of the allied powers and was not able to defend the country during the war years.

 

A look to the memoirs of lieutenant general Amir Ahmadi Sheds light to many questions regarding the army. He says that in 1941 and against the allied forces, His Majesty had two choices: either he should go on a war with the foreign forces and defend the country or surrender to them.

 

In an other part of the memoirs he says: 'I told Reza Shah" as far as I can see, these garrisons will disintegrate and if they are not put to order, they,  themselves might plunder the cities…" In all parts of the country the commanders of the forces took sums of money and light-weighed properties of the garrisons and fled away. The other officers sold the available ammunition and provisions.' He also writes that with forces mainly formed of conscripts, it is not possible to resist against the invading forces, and the cooperation of these conscripts with the invaders is not improbable."

 

Somewhere else he describes Reza Shah's attitude: ' I found out that the garrisons had disintegrated and the inefficient commanders of the army had looted the soldiers and garrisons. Reza Shah decided to go to Isfahan by night, but the senior officers and the commanders had fled away. I said to the Shah: "all people kept and honored us for such a situation, and if we flee a way, our fame will be blotted for ever"… But when I came to the officers 'club at 12 by night, all the high officers and commanders had fled and I could only see commander Movasseq Nakhjavan, whose car was taken away and he had no vehicle to go away.'

 

Remarks made by lieutenant general Amir Ahmadi shows the bitter truth of the nature of Iran's political system on those days. Since he was within that system, he could not find the reasons for it. Somewhere else we see him quoting colonel Shahab: "What is country and what are military forces. The country is the Shah's personal property and the forces are his escort."

 

Undoubtedly, it could not be expected from a man who had come to power by the British support, to defend the country as the patriotic rulers as Nader Shah and Shah Esmaiil did; the men who had strong links with the nation and worked for the welfare of the nation. This is what Reza Shah did not enjoy it and his failure had roots in it.